Abstract. Many transaction systems distribute, partition, and replicate their data for scalability, availability, and fault tolerance. However, observing and maintaining strong consistency of distributed and partially replicated data leads to high transaction latencies. Since different applications require different consistency guarantees, there is a plethora of consistency properties-from weak ones such as read atomicity through various forms of snapshot isolation to stronger serializability propertiesand distributed transaction systems (DTSs) guaranteeing such properties. This paper presents a general framework for formally specifying a DTS in Maude, and formalizes in Maude nine common consistency properties for DTSs so defined. Furthermore, we provide a fully automated method for analyzing whether the DTS satisfies the desired property for all initial states up to given bounds on system parameters. This is based on automatically recording relevant history during a Maude run and defining the consistency properties on such histories. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first time that model checking of all these properties in a unified, systematic manner is investigated. We have implemented a tool that automates our method, and use it to model check state-of-the-art DTSs such as P-Store, RAMP, Walter, Jessy, and ROLA.
Introduction
Applications handling large amounts of data need to partition their data for scalability and elasticity, and need to replicate their data across widely distributed sites for high availability and fault and disaster tolerance. However, guaranteeing strong consistency properties for transactions over partially replicated distributed data requires lot of costly coordination that results in long transaction delays. Different applications require different consistency guarantees, and balancing well the trade-off between performance and consistency guarantees is key to designing distributed transaction systems (DTSs). There is therefore a plethora of consistency properties for DTSs over partially replicated data-from weak properties such as read atomicity through various forms of snapshot isolation to strong serializability guarantees-and DTSs providing such guarantees.
DTSs and their consistency guarantees are typically specified informally and validated only by testing; there is very little work on their automated formal analysis (see Section 8) . We have previously formally modeled and analyzed single state-of-the-art industrial and academic DTSs, such as Google's Megastore, Apache Cassandra, Walter, P-Store, Jessy, ROLA, and RAMP, in Maude [15] .
In this paper we present a generic framework for formalizing both DTSs and their consistency properties in Maude. The modeling framework is very general and should allow us to naturally model most DTSs. We formalize nine popular consistency models in this framework and provide a fully automated methodand a tool which automates this method-for analyzing whether a DTS specified in our framework satisfies the desired consistency property for all initial states with the user-given number of transactions, data items, sites, and so on.
In particular, we show how one can automatically add a monitoring mechanism which records relevant history during a run of a DTS specified in our framework, and we define the consistency properties on such histories so that the DTS can be directly model checked in Maude. We have implemented a tool that uses Maude's meta-programming features to automatically add the monitoring mechanism, that automatically generates all the desired initial states, and that performs the Maude model checking. We have applied our tool to model check state-of-the-art DTSs such as variants of RAMP, P-Store, ROLA, Walter, and Jessy. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first time that model checking of all these properties in a unified, systematic manner is investigated.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides background on rewriting and Maude. Section 3 gives an overview of the consistency properties that we formalize. Section 4 presents our framework for modeling DTSs in Maude, and Section 5 explains how to record the history in such models. Section 6 formally defines consistency models as Maude functions on such recorded histories. Section 7 briefly introduces our tool which automates the entire process. Finally, Section 8 discusses related work and Section 9 gives some concluding remarks. the form var:sort and be introduced on the fly. An equation f (t 1 , . . . , t n ) = t with the owise ("otherwise") attribute can be applied to a subterm f (. . .) only if no other equation with left-hand side f (u 1 , . . . , u n ) can be applied. Maude also provides standard parameterized data types (sets, maps, etc.) that can be instantiated (and renamed); for example, pr SET{Nat} * (sort Set{Nat} to Nats) defines a sort Nats of sets of natural numbers.
A class declaration class C | att 1 : s 1 , ..., att n : s n declares a class C of objects with attributes att 1 to att n of sorts s 1 to s n . An object instance of class C is represented as a term < O : C | att 1 : val 1 , . . . , att n : val n >, where O, of sort Oid, is the object's identifier, and where val 1 to val n are the current values of the attributes att 1 to att n . A message is a term of sort Msg. A system state is modeled as a term of the sort Configuration, and has the structure of a multiset made up of objects and messages.
The dynamic behavior of a system is axiomatized by specifying each of its transition patterns by a rewrite rule. For example, the rule (with label l) defines a family of transitions in which a message m(O, w) is read and consumed by an object O of class C, whose attribute a1 is changed to x + w, and a new message m'(O',x) is generated. Attributes whose values do not change and do not affect the next state, such as a3 and a2, need not be mentioned in a rule. Maude also supports metaprogramming in the sense that a Maude specification M can be represented as a term M (of sort Module), so that a module transformation can be defined as a Maude function f : Module → Module.
Reachability Analysis in Maude. Maude provides a number of analysis methods, including rewriting for simulation purposes, reachability analysis, and linear temporal logic (LTL) model checking. In this paper, we use reachability analysis. Given an initial state init, a state pattern pattern and an (optional) condition cond , Maude's search command searches the reachable state space from init in a breadth-first manner for states that match pattern such that cond holds:
where bound is an upper bound on the number of solutions to look for. The arrow =>! means that Maude only searches for final states (i.e., states that cannot be further rewritten) that match pattern and satisfies cond . If the arrow is instead =>* then Maude searches for all reachable states satisfying the search condition.
Transactional Consistency
Different applications require different consistency guarantees. There are therefore many consistency properties for DTSs on partially replicated distributed data stores. This paper focuses on the following nine, which span a spectrum from weak consistency such as read committed to strong consistency like serializability:
-Read committed (RC ) [6] disallows a transaction 4 from seeing any uncommitted or aborted data.
-Cursor stability (CS ) [17] , widely implemented by commercial SQL systems (e.g., IBM DB2 [1] ) and academic prototypes (e.g., MDCC [23] ), guarantees RC and in addition prevents the lost update anomaly. -Read atomicity (RA) [5] [4] weakens PSI by allowing a transaction to read a version committed after the transaction begins: Alice may see Bob's post that committed after her transaction started executing. -Serializability (SER) [36] ensures that the execution of concurrent transactions is equivalent to one where the transactions are run one at a time. -Strict Serializability (SSER) strengthens SER by enforcing the serial order to follow real time.
Modeling Distributed Transaction Systems in Maude
This section presents a framework for modeling in Maude DTSs that satisfy the following general assumptions:
-We can identify and record "when" 5 a transaction starts executing at its server/proxy and "when" the transaction is committed and aborted at the different sites involved in its validation.
-The transactions record their read and write sets.
If a such a DTS is modeled in this framework, our tool can automatically model check whether it satisfies the above consistency properties, as long as it can detect the read and write sets and the above events: start of transaction execution, and abort/commit of a transaction at a certain site. This section explains how the system should be modeled so that our tool automatically discovers these events.
We make the following additional assumptions about the DTSs we target:
-The database is distributed across of a number of sites, or servers or replicas, that communicate by asynchronous message passing. Data are partially replicated across these sites: a data item may be replicated/stored at more than one site. The sites replicating a data item are called that item's replicas. -Systems evolve by message passing or local computations. Servers communicate by asynchronous message passing with arbitrary but finite delays. -A client forwards a transaction to be executed to some server (called the transaction's executing server or proxy), which executes the transaction. -Transaction execution should terminate in commit or abort.
Modeling DTSs in Maude
A DTS is modeled in an object-oriented style, where the state consists of a number of replica objects, each modeling a local database/server/site, and a number of messages traveling between the replica objects. A transaction is modeled as an object which resides inside the replica object executing the transaction.
Basic Data Types. There are user-defined sorts Key for data items (or keys) and Version for versions of data items, with a partial order < on versions, with v < v denoting that v is a later version of v in <:
We then define key-version pairs <key,version> and sets of such pairs, that model a transaction's read and write sets, as follows:
sorts Key Version KeyVersion . op <_,_> : Key Version -> KeyVersion . pr SET{KeyVersion} * (sort Set{KeyVersion} to KeyVersions) . Example 1. A version in our Maude model [29] of the Walter transactional data store [39] consists of the executing server's identifier, and a sequence number local to that server:
where the sort Oid refers to the object identifier, and Nat models sequence numbers as natural numbers.
To track the status of a transaction (on non-proxies, or remote servers) we define a sort TxnStatus consisting of some transaction's identifier and its status; this is used to indicate whether a remote transaction (one executed on another server) is committed on this server:
pr SET{TxnStatus} * (sort Set{TxnStatus} to TxnStatusSet) .
Modeling Replicas. A replica (or site) stores parts of the database, executes the transactions for which it is the proxy, helps validating other transactions, and is formalized as an object instance of a subclass of the following class Replica:
class Replica | executing : Configuration, committed : Configuration, aborted : Configuration, decided : TxnStatusSet .
The attributes executing, committed, and aborted contain, respectively, transactions that are being executed, and have been committed or aborted on the executing server; decided is the status of transactions executed on other servers. To model a system-specific replica a user should specify it as an object instance of a subclass of the class Replica with new attributes. where readSet and writeSet denote the key/version pairs read and written by the transaction, respectively. Modeling System Dynamics. We describe how the rewrite rules defining the start of a transaction execution and aborts and commits at different sites should be defined so that our tool can detect these events.
-The start of a transaction execution must be modeled by a rewrite rule where the transaction object appears in the proxy server's executing attribute in the right-hand side, but not in the left-hand side, of the rewrite rule. -When a transaction is committed on the executing server, the transaction object must appear in the committed attribute in the right-hand side-but not in the left-hand side-of the rewrite rule. Furthermore, the readSet and writeSet attributes must be explicitly given in the transaction object. -When a transaction is aborted by the executing server, the transaction object must appear in the aborted attribute in the right-hand side, but not in the left-hand side, of a rewrite rule. Again, the transaction should present its attributes writeSet and readSet (to be able to record relevant history).
Example 6. If either of the two conflict checks for fast commit fails, the executing Walter replica aborts the transaction: < TABLE : Table | table : REPLICA-TABLE >  < -TABLE) /\ (modified(WS, VTS, DS) or locked(WS, LOCKS)) .
-A rewrite rule that models when a transaction's status is decided remotely (i.e., not on the executing server) must contain in the right-hand side (only) the transaction's identifier and its status in the replica's decided attribute.
Example 7. Upon receiving the "disaster-safe durable" message, the remote Walter replica "commits" the transaction TID by setting its status to true: These requirements are not very strict. The Maude models of the DTSs RAMP [32] , Faster [27] , Walter [29] , ROLA [28] , Jessy [31] , and P-Store [35] can all be seen as instantiations of our modeling framework, with very small syntactic changes, such as defining transaction and replica objects as subclasses of Txn and Replica, changing the names of the attributes and sorts, etc. The Apache Cassandra NoSQL key-value store can be seen as a transaction system where each transaction is a single operation; the Maude model of Cassandra in [33] can also be easily modified to fit within our modeling framework.
Adding Execution Logs
To formalize and analyze consistency properties of distributed transaction systems we add an "execution log" that records the history of relevant events during a system execution. This section explains how this history recording can be added automatically to a model of a DTS that is specified as explained in Section 4.
Execution Log
To capture the total order of relevant events in a run, we use a "logical global clock" to order all key events (i.e., transaction starts, commits, and aborts). This clock is incremented by one each time such an event takes place.
A transaction in a replicated DTS is typically committed both locally (at its executing server) and remotely at different times. To capture this, we define a "time vector" using Maude's map data type that maps replica identifiers (of sort Oid) to (typically "logical") clock values (of sort Time, which here are the natural numbers: subsort Nat < Time):
pr MAP{Oid,Time} * (sort Map{Oid,Time} to VectorTime) .
where each element in the mapping has the form replica-id |-> time .
An execution log (of sort Log) maps each transaction (identifier) to a record <proxy, issueTime, finishTime, committed , reads, writes>, with proxy its proxy server, issueTime the starting time at its proxy server, finishTime the commit/abort times at each relevant server, committed a flag indicating whether the transaction is committed at its proxy, reads the key-version pairs read by the transaction, and writes the key-version pairs written: 
Logging Execution History
We show how the relevant history of an execution can be recorded during a run of our Maude model by transforming the original Maude model into one which also records this history.
First, we add to the state a Monitor object that stores the current logical global time in the clock attribute and the current log in the log attribute:
The log is updated each time an interesting event (see Section 4.1) happens. Our tool identifies those events and automatically transforms the corresponding rewrite rules by adding and updating the monitor object.
Executing. A transaction starts executing when the transaction object appears in a Replica's executing attribute in the right-hand side, but not in the lefthand side, of a rewrite rule. The monitor then adds a record for this transaction, with the proxy and start time, to the log, and increments the logical global clock. where the monitor O@M adds a new record for the transaction TID in the log, with starting time (i.e., the current logical global time) GT@M at its executing server RID, finish time (empty), flag (false), read set (empty), and write set (empty). The monitor also increments the global clock by one.
Commit. A transaction commits at its proxy when the transaction object appears in the proxy's committed attribute in the right-hand side, but not in the left-hand side, of a rewrite rule. The record for that transaction is updated with commit status, versions read and written, and commit time, and the global logical clock is incremented. The monitor updates the log for the transaction TID by setting its finish time at the executing server RID to GT@M (insert(RID,GT@M,VTS@M)), setting the committed flag to true, setting the read set to RS and write set to empty (this is a read-only transaction), and increments the global clock.
Abort. Abort is treated as commit, but the commit flag remains false.
Example 10. The monitor object is added to the rewrite rule in Example 6 for aborting a transaction: Table | table : REPLICA-TABLE >  < -TABLE) /\ (modified(WS, VTS, DS) or locked(WS, LOCKS)) .
Decided. When a transaction's status is decided remotely, the record for that transaction's decision time at the remote replica is updated with the current global time.
Example 11. The rewrite rule from Example 7 for committing a transaction remotely is transformed into the following rewrite rule: where the monitor O@M only needs to add the commit time for the replica RID, besides advancing the global time.
Implementing Monitoring Mechanism
We have formalized/implemented the transformation from a Maude specification of a DTS into one with a monitor as a meta-level function monitorRules in Maude.
Specifically, the transformation takes as input Maude modules including the rewrite rules specifying the system dynamics, instruments the "interesting" rewrites rules at the meta-level according to the monitoring mechanism, and outputs a new flattened model of the system and the monitor.
The function monitorRules takes as argument a rewrite rule and returns a new one that is possibly equipped with the monitor and its behavior. The following two equations are defined to formalize the monitoring mechanism: The first equation handles an unconditional rewrite rule, while the second one handles a conditional one.
The meta-level function monitorTerms takes terms T and T' from both sides of a rule, and returns, if monitor needed, two new ones T1 and T2, forming the new rule with the monitor's behavior. The monitor's behavior depends on the input rewrite rule in terms of either the execution, local commit, remote commit, or abort of the transaction. In the cases where the monitor should be added, the term T1 is a concatenation of the term T and the monitor pattern (e.g., < O@M : Monitor | clock: GT@M, log: (TID |-> < VTS1@M, VTS2@M, FLAG@M, READS@M, WRITES@M), LOG@M)>), while the term T2 is a concatenation of the term T', and the resulting monitor pattern determined by the status change of the transaction encoded by the input rewrite rule. where the function newMonitor is used to construct a new monitor pattern with a given transaction's identifier, and resultMonitor constructs the resulting pattern with the transaction's identifier, replica's identifier, a Boolean value indicating whether the transaction is successfully committed or not, the set of versions read, and the set of versions written by the transaction. The function isCommitted returns true if the transition from T to T' is caused by the local commit of the transition T1, which is determined by whether the transaction appears in the attribute committed in T', but not in that in T.
Formalizing Consistency Models in Maude
This section formalizes the consistency properties in Section 3 as functions on the "history log" of a completed run. We can then use these functions to automatically analyze in Maude whether a system with a given initial state satisfies a desired consistency property by searching for a final state (all transactions have finished) where the desired property does not hold on the history log. The entire Maude specification of these functions is available at https: //github.com/siliunobi/cat.
Read Committed (RC).
(A transaction cannot read any writes by uncommitted transactions.) Note that standard definitions for single-version databases disallow reading versions that are not committed at the time of the read. We follow the definition for multi-versioned systems by Adya, summarized by Bailis et al. [5] , that defines the RC property as follows: (i) a committed transaction cannot read a version that was written by an aborted transaction; and (ii) a transaction cannot read intermediate values: that is, if T writes two versions < X,V > and < X,V' > with V < V', then no T = T can read < X,V >.
The first equation defining the function rc, specifying when RC holds, checks whether some (committed) transaction TID1 read version V of key X (i.e., < X,V > is in TID's read set < X,V > , RS, where RS matches the rest of TID's read set), and this version V was written by some transaction TID2 that was never committed (i.e., TID2's commit flag is false, and its write set is < X,V > , WS'). The second equation checks whether there was an intermediate read of a version < X,V > that was overwritten by the same transaction TID2 that wrote the version: Read Atomicity (RA). A system guarantees RA if it prevents fractured reads and prevents transactions from reading uncommitted or aborted data. A transaction T j exhibits fractured reads if transaction T i writes versions x m and y n , T j reads version x m and version y k , and k < n [5] . The function fracRead checks whether there are fractured reads in the log. There is a fractured read if a transaction TID2 reads X and Y, transaction TID1 writes X and Y, TID2 reads the version VX of X written by TID1, and reads a version VY' of Y written before VY (VY' < VY): We define RA as the combination of RC and no fractured reads:
op ra : Log -> Bool . eq ra(LOG) = rc(LOG) and not fracRead(LOG) .
Cursor Stability (CS) [17] strengthens RC by also preventing lost updates (LU). LU can only happen with multiple conditional writes (i.e., a transaction first fetches some value of an data item, and then updates it with a new value) fetching the same data. Once one of those transactions commits its writes, the others must be aborted. The function lu captures the case when there are two committed transactions TID1 and TID2, both of which read the same version V of data item X (i.e., < X,V > is in the read sets of both TID1 and TID2), and commit on the same key (i.e., the two transactions wrote < X,VX > and < X,VX' >, respectively):
op lu: Log -> Bool . eq lu(TID1 |-> < O, T, VT, true, (< X,V > , RS), (< X,VX >, WS) >, TID2 |-> < O', T', VT', true, (< X,V > , RS'), (< X,VX' >, WS') >,LOG) = true . eq lu(LOG) = false [owise] .
CS can then be specified as conjunction of RC and no lost updates:
op cs : Log -> Bool . eq cs(LOG) = rc(LOG) and not lu(LOG) .
Update Atomicity [13, 28] provides read atomicity and prevents lost updates:
op ua : Log -> Bool . eq ua(LOG) = ra(LOG) and not lu(LOG) .
Snapshot Isolation (SI) is defined by two properties in [39]:
-SI-1 (snapshot read): All operations in a transaction read the most recent committed version as of time when the transaction began. -SI-2 (no write-write conflicts): The write sets of each pair of committed concurrent 8 transactions must be disjoint.
The function notSnapshotRead holds when SI-1 is violated. The first conditional equation handles the case when a transaction TID1 reads another transaction TID2's version written (< X,V >), while the most recent committed version from TID1's perspective is < X,V' > written by TID3 (TID3's commit time T' at its proxy RID3 is between TID2's commit time T at its proxy RID2 and TID1's start time T1). The second conditional equation checks if TID1 read some version that was committed after it started (T1 < T): The function wwConflict captures write-write conflicts: there are two transactions TID1 and TID2, both writing key X, and TID2 is committed at its proxy at time T, which comes after the start time T1 of TID1 but before its commit time T2 at its proxy. The committed (flag true) transactions TID1 and TID2 are therefore concurrent and write the same key, and hence we have a write-write conflict: SI holds when there is no violation of snapshot read and no write-write conflicts:
op si : Log -> Bool . eq si(LOG) = not notSnapshotRead(LOG) and not wwConflict(LOG) .
Parallel snapshot isolation (PSI) is given by three properties [39]:
-PSI-1 (site snapshot read): All operations read the most recent committed version at the transaction's site as of time when the transaction began. -PSI-2 (no write-write conflicts): The write sets of each pair of committed somewhere-concurrent 9 transactions must be disjoint. -PSI-3 (commit causality across sites): If a transaction T 1 commits at a site S before a transaction T 2 starts at site S, then T 1 cannot commit after T 2 at any site.
The function notSiteSnapshotRead checks whether the system log satisfies PSI-1 by returning true if there is a transaction that did not read the most recent committed version at its executing site when it began: In the first equation, the transaction TID1, hosted at site RID1, has in its read set a version < X,V > written by TID2. Some transaction TID3 wrote version < X,V' > and was committed at RID1 after TID2 was committed at RID1 (T3 > T2) and before TID1 started executing (T3 < T). Hence, the version read by TID1 was stale. The second equation checks if TID1 read some version that was committed at RID1 after TID1 started (T < T2).
The function someWhereConflict checks whether PSI-2 holds by looking for a write-write conflict between any pair of committed somewhere-concurrent transactions in the system log: In contrast with the function wwConflict, the above function checks whether the transactions with the write conflict are concurrent at the transaction TID1's proxy RID1. Here, TID2 commits at RID1 at time T2, which is between TID1's start time T and its commit time T1 at RID1.
The function notCausality analyzes PSI-3 by checking whether there was a "bad situation" in which a transaction TID1 committed at site RID2 before a transaction TID2 started at site RID2 (T1 < T2), while TID1 committed at site RID after TID2 committed at site RID (T3 > T4): PSI can then be defined by combining the above three properties:
op psi : Log -> Bool . eq psi(LOG) = not notSiteSnapshotRead(LOG) and not someWhereConflict(LOG) and not notCausality(LOG) .
Non-monotonic snapshot isolation (NMSI) is the same as PSI except that a transaction may read a version committed even after the transaction begins [3] . NMSI can therefore be defined as the conjunction of PSI-2 and PSI-3:
op nmsi : Log -> Bool . eq nmsi(LOG) = not someWhereConflict(LOG) and not notCausality(LOG) .
Serializability (SER) means that the concurrent execution of transactions is equivalent to executing them in some (non-overlapping in time) sequence [36] . A formal definition of SER is based on direct serialization graphs (DSGs): an execution is serializable if and only if the corresponding DSG is acyclic. Each node in a DSG corresponds to a committed transaction, and directed edges in a DSG correspond to the following types of direct dependencies [2] :
-Read dependency: Transaction T j directly read-depends on transaction T i if T i writes some version x i and T j reads that version x i . -Write dependency: Transaction T j directly write-depends on transaction T i if T i writes some version x i and T j writes x's next version after x i in the version order. -Antidependency: Transaction T j directly antidepends on transaction T i if T i reads some version x k and T j writes x's next version after x k .
There is a directed edge from a node T i to another node T j if transaction T j directly read-/write-/antidepends on transaction T i . The dependencies/edges can easily be extracted from the our log as follows:
-If there is a key-version pair < X , V > both in T2's read set and in T1's write set, then T2 read-depends on T1. -If T1 writes < X, V1 > and T2 writes < X, V2 >, and V1 < V2, and there no version < X, V > with V1 < V < V2, then T2 write-depends on T1. -T2 antidepends on T1 if < X, V1 > is in T1's read set, < X, V2 > is in T2's write set with V1 < V2 and there is no version < X, V > such that V1 < V < V2.
We have defined in Maude a data type Dsg for DSGs:
sorts Dsg Edge . subsort Edge < Dsg . We have defined a function dsg that constructs the DSG from a log by iteratively adding edges between committed transactions (aborted transactions are dropped from the log):
op dsg : Log -> Dsg . op dsg : Log Log Dsg -> Dsg . eq dsg(LOG) = dsg(LOG,LOG,emptyDsg) . eq dsg((TID |-> < O,T,VT,false,RS,WS >,LOG'),LOG,DSG) = dsg(LOG',LOG,DSG) .
For each transaction in the log, the construction builds up dependency edges with the read set and write set in order; within the read/write set, the construction checks dependencies for each version read/written. First, we find read dependencies for versions read in the read set: where the transaction TID reads KVER written by another transaction TID', and thus a new edge < TID' ; TID > is added to the DSG. If VS' written by the transaction TID' is the next version of VS read by the transaction TID, we add an antidependency edge < TID ; TID' > to the DSG: where the function committedBetween returns true if there is a version committed between the two versions in the version order. It is defined as: If there is no more edge to add for the current version read, we move to the next version read: Once all versions read in the read set are handled, we continue to build up the DSG by investigating the write set.
If the transaction TID' writes the next version VS' of VS written by another transaction TID, an write-dependency edge < TID ; TID' > is added to the DSG: If VS written by the transaction TID is the next version of VS' read by the transaction TID', we add an antidependency edge < TID' ; TID > to the DSG: When all dependency edges are handled for a transaction (indicated by empty for both the read set and write set), we move to the next (committed) transaction:
eq dsg((TID |-> < O,T,VT,true,empty,empty >,LOG'),LOG,DSG) = dsg(LOG',LOG,DSG) .
Finally, we get the resulting DSG out of the execution history:
eq dsg(empty,LOG,DSG) = DSG .
Based on the constructed DSG, we define a function cycle : Dsg -> Bool that checks whether the DSG has cycles: where the function txnIds returns a set of identifiers of all transactions in the DSG; the function destNodes computes for some node in the DSG all nodes it directly points to by the dependency edges:
op txnIds : Dsg -> OidSet . eq txnIds(DSG ; < TID ; TID' >) = TID ; TID' ; txnIds(DSG) . eq txnIds(emptyDsg) = empty .
op destNodes : Oid Dsg -> OidSet . eq destNodes(TID,(< TID ; TID' > ; DSG)) = TID' ; destNodes(TID,DSG) . eq destNodes(TID,DSG) = empty [owise] .
Strict Serializability (SSER) guarantees that all transactions can be serialized in an order that also respects the real time order. For example, under SSER, once an update transaction commits its writes, all later transactions (where "later" is defined by wall-clock time modeled by our logical global clock) should return the version of that transaction or the version of a later update transaction.
Thus we define the following three functions to check if the read, write, or anti-dependency does not respect the real-time order, respectively.
If a transaction reads some stale data, the read dependency violates the realtime order: where the transaction TID1 reads the stale data < X,VS > written by TID2. The data is stale because there is some version committed between TID2's commit and TID1's start in real time. This is determined by the function rtCommittedBetween: Finally, by combining the three checks we have the definition for SSER:
op sser : Log -> Bool . eq sser(LOG) = not notRtReadDep(LOG) and not notRtWriteDep(LOG) and not notRtAntiDep(LOG) .
Formal Analysis of Consistency Properties of DTSs
We have implemented the Consistency Analysis Tool (CAT) that automates the method in this paper. CAT takes as input:
-A Maude model of the DTS specified as explained in Section 4.
-The number of each of the following parameters: read-only, write-only, and read-write transactions; operations for each type of transaction; clients; servers; keys; and replicas per key. The tool analyzes the desired property for all initial states with the number of each of these parameters. -The consistency property to be analyzed.
Given these inputs, CAT performs the following steps:
1. adds the monitoring mechanism to the user-provided system model; 2. generates all possible initial states with the user-provided number of the different parameters; and 3. executes the following command to search, from all generated initial states, for one reachable final state where the consistency property does not hold: where the underlined functions are parametric, and are instantiated by the user inputs; e.g., consistency-property is replaced by the corresponding function rc, psi, nmsi, . . . , or ser, depending on which property to analyze.
CAT outputs either "No solution," meaning that all runs from all the given initial states satisfy the desired consistency property, or a counterexample (in Maude at the moment) showing a behavior that violates the property. We have applied our tool to 15 Maude models of state-of-the-art DTSs (different variants of RAMP and Walter, ROLA, Jessy, P-Store, and Cassandra) against all nine properties. Table 1 shows our experience with CAT: all model checking results are as expected. It is worth remarking that our automatic analysis found all the violations of properties that the respective systems should violate. There are also some cases where model checking is not applicable ("-" in Table 1 ): (i) some system models do not include a mechanism for committing a transaction on remote servers (i.e., no commit time on any remote server is recorded by the monitor). Thus, model checking NMSI or PSI is not applicable; and (ii) Cassandra is a NoSQL key-value store that concerns only non-transactional consistency models. Thus, model checking transactional consistency properties is not applicable.
We have performed our analysis with different initial states, with up to 4 transactions, 4 operations per transaction, 2 clients, 2 servers, 2 keys, and 2 replicas per key. Each analysis command took about 10 minutes (worst case) to execute on a 2.9 GHz Intel 4-Core i7-3520M CPU with 3.6 GB memory. Table 1 . Model Checking Results w.r.t. Consistency Properties. " ", "×", and "-" refer to satisfying and violating the property, and "not applicable", respectively.
Maude Model LOC Consistency Property RC RA CS UA NMSI PSI SI SER SSER RAMP-F [32] 330 [28] 411 --× × × Jessy [31] 413 × × × × Walter¬Repl [28] 800 × × × Walter [29] 830 × × × P-Store [35] 438 × Cassandra [30] 252 ---------
Related Work
Formalizing Consistency Properties in a Single Framework. Adya [2] uses dependencies between reads and writes to define different isolation models in database systems. Bailis et al. [5] adopts this model to define read atomicity. Burckhardt et al. [11] and Cerone et al. [13] propose axiomatic specifications of consistency models for transaction systems using visibility and arbitration relationships. Shapiro et al. [38] propose a classification along three dimensions (total order, visibility, and transaction composition) for transactional consistency models. Crooks et al. [16] formalizes transactional consistency properties in terms of observable states from a client's perspective. On the non-transactional side, Burckhardt [10] focuses on session and eventual consistency models. Viotti et al. [41] expands his work by covering more than 50 non-transactional consistency properties. Szekeres et al. [40] propose a unified model based on result visibility to formalize both transactional and non-transactional consistency properties.
All of these studies propose semantic models of consistency properties suitable for theoretical analysis. In contrast, we aim at algorithmic methods for automatically verifying consistency properties based on executable specifications of both the systems and their consistency models. Furthermore, none of the studies covered all of the transactional consistency models considered in this paper.
Model Checking Distributed Transaction Systems. There is very little work on model checking state-of-the-art DTSs, maybe because the complexity of these systems requires expressive formalisms. Engineers at Amazon Web Services successfully used TLA+ to model check key algorithms in Amazon's Simple Storage Systems and DynamoDB database [34] ; however, they do not state which consistency properties, if any, were model checked. The designers of the TAPIR transaction protocol have specified and model checked correctness properties of their design using TLA+ [44] . The IronFleet framework [22] combines TLA+ analysis and Floyd-Hoare-style imperative verification to reason about protocol-level concurrency and implementation complexities, respectively. Their methodology requires "considerable assistance from the developer" to perform the proofs. Cai [12] proposes some basic patterns for modeling real-time transactions, and uses Timed Computation Tree Logic (TCTL) to specify the timeliness and ACID properties. Li [26] models three multi-version concurrency control mechanisms using the patterns in [12] , and verifies transaction timeliness and SER in UP-PAAL. These case studies are based on timed automata, and none of them checks state-of-the-art DTSs.
Distributed model checkers [24, 43] are used to model check implementations of distributed systems such as Cassandra, ZooKeeper, the BerkeleyDB database and a replication protocol implementation.
Our previous work [20, 21, 33, 30, 35, 27, 28, 29, 31, 8] specifies and model checks single DTSs and consistency properties in different ways, as opposed to in a single framework that, furthermore, automates the "monitoring" and analysis process.
Other Formal Reasoning about Distributed Database Systems. Cerone et al. [14] develop a new characterization of SI and apply it to the static analysis of DTSs. Bernardi et al. [7] propose criteria for checking the robustness of transactional programs against consistency models. Bouajjani et al. [9] propose a formal definition of eventual consistency, and reduce the problem of checking eventual consistency to reachability and model checking problems. Gotsman et al. [19] propose a proof rule for reasoning about non-transactional consistency choices.
There is also work [42, 25, 37] that focuses on specifying, implementing and verifying distributed systems using the Coq proof assistant. Their executable Coq "implementations" can be seen as executable high-level formal specifications, but the theorem proving requires nontrivial user interaction.
Finally, the authors in [18] apply both model checking and meta-programming techniques in Maude to a distributed snapshot algorithm and its reachability property, but they do not consider neither transaction systems nor consistency properties.
Concluding Remarks
In this paper we have provided an object-based framework for formally modeling distributed transaction systems (DTSs) in Maude, have explained how such models can be automatically instrumented to record relevant events during a run, and have formally defined a wide range of consistency properties on such histories of events. We have implemented a tool which automates the entire instrumentation and model checking process. Our framework is very general: we could easily adapt previous Maude models of state-of-the-art DTSs such as Apache Cassandra, P-Store, RAMP, Walter, Jessy, and ROLA to our framework.
We then model checked the DTSs w.r.t. all the consistency properties for all initial states with 4 transactions, 2 sites, and so on. This analysis was sufficient to differentiate the DTSs according to which consistency properties they satisfy.
In future work we should formally relate our definitions of the consistency properties to other (non-executable) formalizations of consistency properties. We should also extend our work to formalizing and model checking non-transactional consistency properties for key-value stores such as Cassandra.
